FREE ESSAY ON AUSTRALIAN BICAMERALISM

AUSTRALIAN BICAMERALISM

Australian Bicameralism.
Bicameralism in Australia has a long history dating back to the pre-Federation colonial
parliaments. These structures, in turn, evolved from their British forbear, the
parliament at Westminster. At federal and state levels there has been considerable debate
and controversy over the continuing efficacy and efficiency of the two-house model. Is it
necessary or desirable to maintain two houses of parliament for state and federal
governments in Australia? Did the Queensland government do the right thing in abolishing
its upper house? What is the future of bicameralism in Australia? These are some of the
questions that this essay will seek to address.
Parliaments in Australia originally consisted of councils of colonial landowners, the
members of which were appointed by the respective Governors of the individual colonies.
The purpose of these councils was simply to advise the Governor of the day and to assist
him in his duties in administering the colony. No popular mandate was sought or
recognised.
Concurrent with the growth of democratic sentiment in the 19th century, was the
development of popularly elected houses in Australia, along the lines of the British
House of Commons. These houses originally had a very limited franchise, which was
expanded, over time, to include all of the adult population. The Upper Houses of the
newly formed states continued to limit or distort their franchise, and indeed, still do
so in a variety of ways. 
The newly formed Senate was prescribed along different lines. This institution was to be
a house of review, a house designed specifically to empower and protect the states from
the dangers of domination by the federal government. The Senators were elected in equal
number from all the states regardless of population and the Senate was given equal powers
to that of the House of Representatives in all areas excepting the introduction and
amendment of fiscal legislation. In this way it was hoped that States rights and
prerogatives would remain paramount. However the result today is quite different from the
Founding Fathers intent.
The most often stated function of an Australian upper house is to act as a house of
review. That the Legislative Councils and the Senate perform the vital role of double
checking legislation from the lower houses is a central tenant of bicameralism as an
ideal. Unfortunately in many ways this function has been severely undermined by the
ubiquitousness of party politics and discipline. For an upper house to be an effective
house of review it must be, by definition, an independent body. Party politics precluded
this for many years as the state and federal upper houses were dominated by the
conservative parties. When a conservative government held power these upper houses acted
as little more than very expensive rubber stamps for cabinet drafted legislation. And
with the accession of Labor governments they became obstacles to mandated legislation. 
It was only with the introduction of proportional representation at the federal level
that the Senate, at least, became something other than a boys club. 
The advent of minor parties changed the nature of the Senate review function. Due to the
fact that minor parties such as the Australian Democrats tend to hold the balance of
power, it might now be said that genuine review does take place, albeit of a fairly
limited and opportunistic nature. The Democrats seek to modify and, they would say,
ameliorate items of legislation delivered to the Senate from the lower house and to some
extent, imprint their values on each bill that requires Democrat votes.
The idea that members of the Legislative Councils and the Senate act as representatives
of their respective regions is also oft touted. Whether, it is a state or a region of a
state, this function is largely negated by the party system. Having to vote along party
lines, as most parliamentarians do, makes it very difficult for a regional member to
effectively represent the interests of his region over loyalties to his party.
As a check on democracy the upper houses have proven to be quite effective. The
introduction of radical or rapidly drafted legislation into law becomes difficult for a
government that doesn't hold a majority in both houses. In such a case the upper houses
can block the bill or return it to the Lower House for review. It could be argued that
having to go through this two-tiered process prevents the knee-jerk reactions of
incumbent governments from becoming unwelcome and/or unwieldy laws.
A case of the Senate's power being a real impediment to the functioning of Australia's
liberal democracy was encountered during the dismissal of the Whitlam Labor government in
1975. As a result of hostile control of the Senate by conservative forces the duly
elected government of the day was forced out office in what could be seen as an
illegitimate use of the Senates powers. The anti-democratic nature of the house at the
time due to the dubious nature of some appointments made to fill casual vacancies calls
into question whether the Senate had the right to pursue such a course of action. It even
calls into question the necessity and desirability of having such an institution.
The Theodore Labor government of Queensland chose to abolish its Legislative Council in
1922 as a response to ongoing and entrenched conservative opposition in that house. It
remains the only state to have done so and further cases of this kind of action are
unlikely as Upper Houses positions have since been entrenched in most state
constitutions, usually by conservative governments. 
The reforms in Queensland were a start but did not go far enough. To simply rid
government of one of its pillars and replace it with nothing is not in the best interests
of a modern liberal democracy. A more beneficial approach would involve more sweeping
changes:
1. The executive should be separated completely from the legislature so as to prevent the
total executive dominance in the remaining house. 
2. Constitutionally entrenched and powerful regional governments could provide more
immediate local representation and a check on the powers of parliament.
3. Proportional representation should be instituted across the board to give a
parliamentary voice to all members of the community, not just those people who choose to
follow the major parties.
4. A strong Bill of Rights written in to the constitution to protect individual freedoms
from governmental incursion.
These are just some of the changes that could be made to parliaments in Australia in
order to provide a more equitable, democratic and stable framework in which to govern.
Australian bicameralism is an outmoded and obsolete system that impedes the exercise of
democratic freedoms and is adverse to change. As such a move towards a very different
system of government would be advisable. The dynamism inherent in the unicameral system,
with the appropriate curbs as outlined above, would provide Australia with a more modern
and adaptable parliament. A parliament better equipped to confront the challenges of
modern governance.
References
Fenna, A. (2000) Essentials of Australian Government, Draft Version, Tertiary Press
Henderson, P. (1987) Parliament and Politics in Australia. Heinemann, Richmond. 
Jaensch, D. (1992) The Politics Of Australia, Macmillan, Melbourne.
Kilcullen, R.J. (1995) Democracy in Australia.
http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/politics/y67xa.html, Macquarie University. 
Madison, J or Hamilton, A. (1787-88) Federalist, numbers 62 and 63. 
Minnesota House of Representatives, Research Department (1999) Unicameral or Bicameral
Legislatures: The Policy Debate. St.Paul, Minnesota.
Odgers, J.R. (1999) Australian Senate Practise, 9th edn., Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra.
Singleton, Aitken, D., Jinks, B., Warhurst, J., (2000) Australian Political Institutions,
6th edn., Longman, Canberra.
.