FREE ESSAY ON IRAN IRAQ WAR

IRAN IRAQ WAR

Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator is a ruthless despot who has brought enormous misery on
his own people. It is a pity he remains in power... (Finley ).
The tension between Iran and Iraq had deep roots. Long-standing major problems included
rivalries between the minority Sunni Muslims who dominated Iraq and the majority Shiites
and disputes over borders that confined Iraq to its narrow access to the Persian Gulf by
way of the Shatt al Arab waterway. In 1969, when Britain announced its intent to withdraw
from the Gulf, Iran and Iraq already seemed ready for war. That year there was a small
confrontation over the boundary along the Gulf, and disputes flared in the 1970s as well,
once when Iran occupied three Gulf islands in 1971 and several times later over the
border. Most of those differences appeared to have been put to rest by the Algiers Treaty
in 1975. This agreement settled the border dispute over the Shatt al Arab waterway in
Iran's favor. At the same time, Iraq renounced a long-standing claim to the southwestern
portion of Iran; an area called Arabistan by Iraq and Khuzestan by Iran, and recognized
Iranian control of the disputed Gulf Islands. 
Saddam Hussein took over the presidency in 1979. When the Iranian monarchy was
overthrown, Iraq denounced the Algiers Treaty and demanded restoration of the eastern
bank of the Shatt al Arab as the border. After a period of mutual sporadic border
violations and skirmishes, Iraq attacked its neighbor in the summer of 1980. Iran
appeared weak and disorganized and the Iraqi president thought he could easily win. The
Ronald W Reagan administration took office in 1981 when the war between Iran and Iraq was
only a few months old and it built on the Carter Doctrine. Regan indicated his readiness
to keep open the Strait of Hormuz in the event that Iran tried to close the Persian Gulf
to shipping Reagan's military plans for Gulf security were more ambitious than those of
his predecessor. The Reagan administration regarded the lack of an actual American
military presence as a tacit invitation to Soviet intervention. The refusal of the
Persian Gulf States to accept American military forces frustrated the Reagan government,
so the new administration strengthened the rapid deployment concept with significant
expenditures for military construction in the Middle East and nearby areas. In the first
Reagan administration, the United States spent nearly $1 billion on construction and
support facilities, in Morocco, at Lajes Field in the Azores, and on the Indian Ocean
Island base of Diego Garcia. Reagan also made the first official assignment of forces to
the rapid deployment force on the 24th April 1981 and gave it a prominent place in the
defense establishment. While the Carter administration had buried the rapid deployment
force within the U.S. Army Readiness Command, Reagan gave it visibility and prominence.
In October 1981, the connection to the Readiness Command ended, and the task force became
a separate command reporting directly to the secretary of defense through the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. One month later, Exercise BRIGHT STAR 82 showed the growth of plans and
forces, testing a broad range of tactical and logistical capabilities. On January 1,1983,
the force became one of six U.S. multi-service commands. It was renamed The United States
Central Command, its specified theater of operations included Southwest Asia and
northeast Africa. Its commander was given charge of nearly All-American military activity
in that part of the world. Its total deployment potential stood at 300,000.Despite the
increase in the size and capability of the deployable force, there were limits to the
American ability to move its forces overseas. The United States still needed bases and
facilities in the Persian Gulf, and although alone the West could contribute
significantly to the defense of the Gulf, it could not transfer a large combat force on
short notice. 
Throughout the 1980s, Central Command planners emphasized helping friendly nations in the
Middle East defend themselves through training, arms sales, and military liaison as well
as joint maneuvers. The force reassured countries like Saudi Arabia, which rejected an
overt American presence but needed to know that support was available in an emergency.
War started between Iran and Iraq in 1980 and the Arab states around the Gulf generally
backed Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were particularly outspoken in their support. Both
contributed substantially to the $40 to $50 billion that all the Gulf States provided
Iraq. In addition, both allowed Iraq to use their ports for arms shipments and sold oil
on behalf of Iraq. Saudi Arabia also allowed Iraq to build and use a pipeline through its
territory. Although Kuwait was among the most generous contributors to the Iraqi cause,
there were some things the country would not agree to. Early in the war, Iraq renewed a
proposal it had made in 1975 for 99-year leases on the islands of Bubiyan and Warbah.
Kuwait refused. In 1984, Saddam Hussein scaled down his request to a 20-year lease in
exchange for an agreement to a definitive border. Once more Kuwait declined. Despite
their open support of Iraq during the early stages of the war, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
understood that Iraq was a possible threat to their security. With this threat in mind,
they led the effort to create the Gulf Cooperation Council, a regional defense alliance
that was established in May 1981. Iraq, which in 1974 had proclaimed itself the most
important and advanced Arab country in the area and consequently protector of the Gulf
against dangers and encroachments, sought membership, but was denied. While Iran and Iraq
fought it out, the Gulf Cooperation Council progressed toward its goal of creating an
effective regional security structure. Despite the blatant rejection of the Iraqi
application, the members continued to view fundamentalist Iran as the more immediate
threat and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait continued to provide material aid to Iraq. The council
expressed interest in cooperation with the United States but still wanted to keep actual
forces at arm's length. They did not agree with the United States regarding the nature of
the threat to regional stability. The United States worried about the Soviet threat and
the council worried more about its powerful neighbors and Israel. During the 1980's,
confusion in American policy caused a crisis in relations with the Gulf States. In 1984,
the United States reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq, after a seventeen-year
break because they were concerned that Iran might win the war and become a long-range
menace to the supply of oil. In 1988, when Kuwait responded to Iranian attacks on its
shipping by asking the superpowers for protection, the United States was eager to provide
assistance and reassurance of its support. To restore its position in the Gulf, the
United States agreed to re-flag and convoy Kuwaiti ships. Protection of the flow of oil
was in any case still a paramount American interest, and President Reagan affirmed his
commitment to safeguard Gulf exports. Along with the re-flagging, went a major American
naval deployment to protect the tankers. The United States and Saudi Arabia maintained
their close military relationship throughout the Iran-Iraq war, although the official
Saudi position was that both superpowers should keep their forces out of the Persian
Gulf. The Saudis, however, never objected to the American naval contingent in Bahrain and
other periodic displays of American might in threatening situations. Limited American
deployments, among them minesweepers, operational aircraft, and the AWACS, were
acceptable. Reinforcement by U.S. forces in an emergency was always a basic component of
Saudi defense planning, although only in the event of a clear and immediate threat. 
The Iran-lraq war ended in August 1988, with both sides exhausted and Iraq claiming
victory. But Iraq did not succeed in achieving control of the Shatt al Arab. The United
States and the Gulf States continued to support Iraq, with American policy in the Persian
Gulf trying to moderate Iraqi behavior through closer economic ties. Despite human rights
abuses and the continuing development of chemical and nuclear weapons, Iraq's secular
leadership seemed less threatening than Iran's religious zealots. In spite of the
continued support of Iraq, there was a growing perception in the United States that the
major threats to the states of the southern Persian Gulf and to Western oil supplies came
not from the Soviet Union, but from the Gulf region itself. The Saudis knew that the
border with Iraq was ideal for armor operations and that the entire Arabian Peninsula was
vulnerable to attacks from the northeast. Major Saudi oil facilities were only 200 miles
away. King Khalid Military City, with its two armored brigades, provided limited
security, and other Gulf Cooperation Council members had no military forces of
consequence. Any assault on Kuwait might easily become the first stage of a two-phase
attack on the rest of the peninsula. The United States shared Saudi Arabia's concerns.
Kuwait was the door to the entire oil-producing region and it was very vulnerable.
Threats to its stability, either from external or internal pressures, would have wide
ramifications, endangering the flow of oil and the economic health of the industrial
West. In the two years after the fighting between Iran and Iraq ended, Iraq increased its
pressure on Kuwait. Iraq turned its attention to the border that it shared with Kuwait.
In addition to demands for compensation for revenues allegedly lost due to Kuwaiti oil
sales in excess of OPEC quotas and for oil pumped from oil fields claimed by Iraq, Saddam
Hussein's government renewed its interest in Bubiyan and Warbah islands. He cleared the
way for action by beginning negotiations for a final settlement with Iran, massing troops
on the Kuwaiti border, and sounding out the American reaction to a possible military move
into Kuwait. Saddam appeared to ignore the restatement of the Carter Doctrine by the
administration of President Bush in National Security Directive 26 of October
1989,warning that the United States would defend its vital interests by force if
necessary. Meanwhile, Kuwait struggled to find a counterbalance to the increasing Iraqi
threat. Kuwait accepted American construction support and air defense missiles but
stopped short of inviting an American presence in support of its own defense. That
refusal, grounded in strong feelings of national pride, race, and religion, reflected an
unrealistic assessment of its situation. During the first seven months of 1990, Iraqi
troop movements and presidential babble foreshadowed the impending crisis. However, like
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the United States did not recognize the imminence of the Iraqi
threat until it was too late. On 2 August 1990, when Iraqi tanks rolled through Kuwait to
the Saudi border and Saddam Hussein's government declared that Kuwait no longer existed
as an independent country, perceptions quickly changed. President Bush quickly decided to
uphold the Carter Doctrine and commit the United States to direct military action. With a
large majority of the nations of the world opposed to the invasion of Kuwait, President
Bush built a broad-based coalition in support of intervention. The United States, which
took the lead in developing and coordinating opposition to Iraq, achieved a diplomatic
triumph of great magnitude and far-reaching consequence. Urged forward by the United
States, the United Nations General Assembly imposed an embargo on Iraq, and the Security
Council voted to condemn the invasion. Almost immediately, coalition forces moved toward
Southwest Asia. By far the largest contributor to the force, the United States honored
commitments to Saudi Arabia first made by President Truman. The result was Operation
Desert Shield, which before it was over became the Desert Storm. 
Iraq was rather thoroughly trounced in the very short war, and under U.N. resolutions was
required to destroy weapons of mass destruction, comply with a no-fly zone as proscribed
by the coalition forces in order to protect Kurdish refugees, and to ensure response
time, should Iraqi ever again make efforts to invade Kuwait. Several years of testing
provided coalition opportunities to remind Saddam Hussein to curb his military
adventures, with the latest being in September of 1996 when the U.S. Launched Operation
Desert Strike, in order to further extend the No Fly Zone to protect the Kurds in
Southern Iraq and partially in response to an attack by Iraqi military against helpless
refugee camps and the town of Irabli. 
The conflict between Iraq and Iran continues to this day. Mid-September, 1997, Iraq and
Iran exchanged a little air-to-air action, however the activity was short lived as both
sides fled from U.S. aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq. The U.S. made clear
statements to the Iranian government about cruising around in the no fly zone, since U.S.
aircraft are missioned with permitting NO flights, regardless of which country. The
Iran-Iraq war was proven to provide a large amount of Middle Eastern historical
significance, as it led to many more conflicts, such as the Persian Gulf War, which
created mass tensions in the Middle East and around the globe.