FREE ESSAY ON JOHN LOCKE: AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

JOHN LOCKE: AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Book 1: Chapter 1
Go: To the Table of Contents | This is the first Chapter | Forward to Next Chapter
Book I - Neither Principles nor Ideas Are Innate
Chapter I - No Innate Speculative Principles
1. The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. It is
an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain
innate principles; some primary notions, koinai ennoiai, characters, as it were stamped
upon the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into
the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the
falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following
parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may
attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and
may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine
any one will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours
innate in a creature to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the
eyes from external objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several
truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in
ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were
originally imprinted on the mind.
But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the
search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall set
down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my
mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose
themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.
2. General assent the great argument. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted
than that there are certain principles, both speculative and practical, (for they speak
of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they argue, must needs
be the constant impressions which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and
which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of
their inherent faculties.
3. Universal consent proves nothing innate. This argument, drawn from universal consent,
has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were
certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can
be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they
do consent in, which I presume may be done.
4. What is, is, and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, not
universally assented to. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which
is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are
none such: because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall
begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration,
Whatsoever is, is, and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be; which, of
all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a
reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if
any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these
propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of
mankind to whom they are not so much as known.
5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c. For,
first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or
thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which
must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a
contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or
understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making
certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's
perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have
souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them,
and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident
that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how
can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a
notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is
ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No
proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet
conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are
true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to
be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew,
it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it
ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did, nor
ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths
which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity
of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to
know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount
to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to
assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For
nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The
capacity, they say, is innate; the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest
for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being
perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is capable of
knowing in respect of their original: they must all be innate or all adventitious: in
vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions
in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such
truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of.
For if these words to be in the understanding have any propriety, they signify to be
understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the
mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind
or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, Whatsoever is, is, and It is
impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, are by nature imprinted, children
cannot be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them
in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.
6. That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered. To avoid this, it is
usually answered, that all men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of
reason; and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer:
7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to
those who, being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves
say. For, to apply this answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must
signify one of these two things: either that as soon as men come to the use of reason
these supposed native inscriptions come to be known and observed by them; or else, that
the use and exercise of men's reason, assists them in the discovery of these principles,
and certainly makes them known to them.
8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate. If they mean, that by the
use of reason men may discover these principles, and that this is sufficient to prove
them innate; their way of arguing will stand thus, viz. that whatever truths reason can
certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted
on the mind; since that universal assent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no
more but this,- that by the use of reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge
of and assent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims
of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all must be equally allowed
innate; they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that a rational
creature may certainty come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.
9. It is false that reason discovers them. But how can these men think the use of reason
necessary to discover principles that are supposed innate, when reason (if we may believe
them) is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or
propositions that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate which we
have need of reason to discover; unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain
truths that reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reason
necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of
reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the understanding see what is originally
engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it. So that
to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason
discovers to a man what he knew before: and if men have those innate impressed truths
originally, and before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them till they
come to the use of reason, it is in effect to say, that men know and know them not at the
same time.
10. No use made of reasoning in the discovery of these two maxims. It will here perhaps
be said that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not
assented to as soon as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these maxims and
other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing,
more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these
maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in this different: that the one have need of
reason, using of proofs, to make them out and to gain our assent; but the other, as soon
as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I
withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge, which
requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be
confessed that in their discovery there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think
those who give this answer will not be forward to affirm that the knowledge of this
maxim, That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, is a deduction of
our reason. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem so fond of,
whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our
thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires pains and
application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed, that what was imprinted
by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to
discover it?
11. And if there were, this would prove them not innate. Those who will take the pains to
reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find that
this ready assent of the mind to some truths, depends not, either on native inscription,
or the use of reason, but on a faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of them, as
we shall see hereafter. Reason, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our assent
to these maxims, if by saying, that men know and assent to them, when they come to the
use of reason, be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these
maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.
12. The coming to the use of reason not the time we come to know these maxims. If by
knowing and assenting to them when we come to the use of reason, be meant, that this is
the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that as soon as children
come to the use of reason, they come also to know and assent to these maxims; this also
is false and frivolous. First, it is false; because it is evident these maxims are not in
the mind so early as the use of reason; and therefore the coming to the use of reason is
falsely assigned as the time of their discovery. How many instances of the use of reason
may we observe in children, a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim,
That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? And a great part of
illiterate people and savages pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever
thinking on this and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to the
knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they
come to the use of reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because, till after
they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind,
about which those general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles, but are
indeed discoveries made and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the same
way, and discovered by the same steps, as several other propositions, which nobody was
ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this
Discourse. I allow therefore, a necessity that men should come to the use of reason
before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny that men's coming to the
use of reason is the time of their discovery.
13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable truths. In the mean time it is
observable, that this saying, that men know and assent to these maxims when they come to
the use of reason, amounts in reality of fact to no more but this,- that they are never
known nor taken notice of before the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to some
time after, during a man's life; but when is uncertain. And so may all other knowable
truths, as well as these; which therefore have no advantage nor distinction from others
by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason; nor are thereby proved to
be innate, but quite the contrary.
14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery it would not prove
them innate. But, secondly, were it true that the precise time of their being known and
assented to were, when men come to the use of reason; neither would that prove them
innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous as the supposition itself is false. For, by
what kind of logic will it appear that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in
the mind in its first constitution, because it comes first to be observed and assented to
when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert itself?
And therefore the coming to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time that these
maxims are first assented to, (which it may be with as much truth as the time when men
come to the use of reason,) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say
they are innate because men assent to them when they come to the use of reason. I agree
then with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and
self-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that
the coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of,
and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can
with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men assent to them when they come to
the use of reason, is no more but this,- that the making of general abstract ideas, and
the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and
growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names
that stand for them, till, having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar
and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary discourse and actions with others,
acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these maxims, when
men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may be shown;
or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate.
15. The steps by which the mind attains several truths. The senses at first let in
particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing
familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them.
Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of
general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the
materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty. And the use of reason becomes
daily more visible, as these materials that give it employment increase. But though the
having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow together,
yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I
confess, is very early in the mind but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if
we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it
being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have
earliest to do, which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus
got, the mind discovers that some agree and others differ, probably as soon as it has any
use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. But whether
it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words; or
comes to that which we commonly call the use of reason. For a child knows as certainly
before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i.e. that sweet
is not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and
sugarplums are not the same thing.
16. Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what
their terms mean, and not on their innateness. A child knows not that three and four are
equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of
equality; and then, upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather
perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent because
it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then because he wanted the use of
reason; but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in his mind the
clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth of that
proposition upon the same grounds and by the same means, that he knew before that a rod
and a cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also that he may come to
know afterwards That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, as shall be
more fully shown hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those
general ideas about which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those general
terms that stand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the
later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims;- whose terms, with the
ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel, he must stay
till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a
capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him
put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree,
according as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that a man knows
that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven, by the same self-evidence that he
knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a child knows this not so soon as the other;
not for want of the use of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen,
and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signified by one,
two, and three.
17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate. This evasion
therefore of general assent when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and
leaving no difference between those suppose innate and other truths that are afterwards
acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they
call maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms
they are proposed in understood: seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and
understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove
them innate. For since men never fail after they have once understood the words, to
acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these
propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the
mind, at the very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to, and after that
never doubts again.
18. If such an assent be a mark of innate, then that one and two are equal to three, that
sweetness is not bitterness, and a thousand the like, must be innate. In answer to this,
I demand whether ready assent given to a proposition, upon first hearing and
understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle? If it be not, such a
general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be said that it is a mark of
innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are generally
assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with
innate principles. For upon the same ground, viz. of assent at first hearing and
understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also
admit several propositions about numbers to be innate; and thus, that one and two are
equal to three, that two and two are equal to four, and a multitude of other the like
propositions in numbers, that everybody assents to at first hearing and understanding the
terms, must have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of
numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them; but even natural philosophy,
and all the other sciences, afford propositions which are sure to meet with assent as
soon as they are understood. That two bodies cannot be in the same place is a truth that
nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims, that it is impossible for the same thing
to be and not to be, that white is not black, that a square is not a circle, that
bitterness is not sweetness. These and a million of such other propositions, as many at
least as we have distinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing
what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their
own rule, and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms to be a mark of
innate, they must allow not only as many innate propositions as men have distinct ideas,
but as many as men can make propositions wherein different ideas are denied one of
another. Since every proposition wherein one different idea is denied of another, will as
certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this general one,
It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, or that which is the foundation
of it, and is the easier understood of the two, The same is not different; by which
account they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without
mentioning any other. But, since no proposition can be innate unless the ideas about
which it is be innate, this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes,
figure, &c., innate, than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and
experience. Universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding the terms is, I
grant, a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, depending not on innate impressions,
but on something else, (as we shall show hereafter,) belongs to several propositions
which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.
19. Such less general propositions known before these universal maxims. Nor let it be
said, that those more particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at
first hearing, as that one and two are equal to three, that green is not red, &c., are
received as the consequences of those more universal propositions which are looked on as
innate principles; since any one, who will but take the pains to observe what passes in
the understanding, will certainly find that these, and the like less general
propositions, are certainly known, and firmly assented to by those who are utterly
ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those (as
they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are
received at first hearing.
20. One and one equal to Two, &c., not general nor useful, answered. If it be said, that
these propositions, viz. two and two are equal to four, red is not blue, &c., are not
general maxims, nor of any great use, I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of
universal assent upon hearing and understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of
innate, whatever proposition can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard
and understood, that must be admitted for an innate proposition, as well as this maxim,
That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, they being upon this ground
equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote
from being innate; those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first
apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident propositions; and therefore it
is longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing understanding. And as
to the usefulness of these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as
is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.
21. These maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate. But we
have not yet done with assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their
terms. It is fit we first take notice that this, instead of being a mark that they are
innate, is a proof of the contrary; since it supposes that several, who understand and
know other things, are ignorant of these principles till they are proposed to them; and
that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others. For, if
they were innate, what need they be proposed in order to gaining assent, when, by being
in the understanding, by a natural and original impression, (if there were any such,)
they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the
mind than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better
after he has been thus taught them than he did before. Whence it will follow that these
principles may be made more evident to us by others' teaching than nature has made them
by impression: which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but
little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of
all our other knowledge; as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men
grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their being proposed:
but it is clear that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he then begins to know a
proposition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not
because it was innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the things
contained in those words would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he
is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing and
understanding the terms must pass for an innate principle, every well-grounded
observation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is
certain that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on these observations, and
reduce them into general propositions: not innate, but collected from a preceding
acquaintance and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing men have made
them, unobserving men, when they are proposed to them, cannot refuse their assent to.
22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the mind is capable of
understanding them, or else signifies nothing. If it be said, the understanding hath an
implicit knowledge of these principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing
(as they must who will say that they are in the understanding before they are known,) it
will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding
implicitly, unless it be this,- that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting
firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first
principles, must be received as native impressions on the mind; which I fear they will
scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to
it when demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the
diagrams they have drawn were but copies of those innate characters which nature had
engraven upon their minds.
23. The argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no
precedent teaching. There is, I fear, this further weakness in the foregoing argument,
which would persuade us that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate, which men
admit at first hearing; because they assent to propositions which they are not taught,
nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonstration, but a bare explication or
understanding of the terms. Under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, that men
are supposed not to be taught nor to learn anything de novo; when, in truth, they are
taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For, first, it is evident
that they have learned the terms, and their signification; neither of which was born with
them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case: the ideas themselves, about
which the proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got
afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to at first hearing, the terms
of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they
stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in
such propositions that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that proposition
whose terms or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas and names, and
learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propositions made in
such terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement
we can perceive in our ideas when put together is expressed, we at first hearing assent;
though to other propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are
concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of
assenting. For, though a child quickly assents to this proposition, That an apple is not
fire, when by familiar acquaintance he has got the ideas of those two different things
distinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire stand for
them; yet it will be some years after, perhaps, before the same child will assent to this
proposition, That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be; because that,
though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the signification of them being
more large, comprehensive, and abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible
things the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning,
and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for.
Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition
made up of such general terms; but as soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learned
their names, he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned
propositions: and with both for the same reason; viz. because he finds the ideas he has
in his mind to agree or disagree, according as the words standing for them are affirmed
or denied one of another in the proposition. But if propositions be brought to him in
words which stand for ideas he has not yet in his mind, to such propositions, however
evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is
ignorant. For words being but empty sounds, any further than they are signs of our ideas,
we cannot but assent to them as they correspond to those ideas we have, but no further
than that. But the showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds; and the
grounds of several degrees of assent, being the business of the following Discourse, it
may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those
innate principles.
24. Not innate, because not universally assented to. To conclude this argument of
universal consent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles,- that if they are
innate, they must needs have universal assent. For that a truth should be innate and yet
not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant
of it at the same time. But then, by these men's own confession, they cannot be innate;
since they are not assented to by those who understand not the terms; nor by a great part
of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of those
propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But were the number far
less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby show these propositions
not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.
25. These maxims not the first known. But that I may not be accused to argue from the
thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what passes in their
understandings before they express it; I say next, that these two general propositions
are not the truths that first possess the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all
acquired and adventitious notions: which, if they were innate, they must needs be.
Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when
children begin to think, and their words and actions do assure us that they do so. When
therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it rationally be
supposed they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted, were there any
such? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the
impressions from things without, and be at the same time ignorant of those characters
which nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to
adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very
principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the
foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings? This would be
to make nature take pains to no purpose; or at least to write very ill; since its
characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things very well: and those
are very ill supposed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our
knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of
several other things may be had. The child certainly knows, that the nurse that feeds it
is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid of: that the wormseed or
mustard it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it cries for: this it is certainly and
undoubtedly assured of: but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, That it
is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, that it so firmly assents to these
and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of
that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths?
He that will say, children join in these general abstract speculations with their
sucking-bottles and their rattles, may perhaps, with justice, be thought to have more
passion and zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of that age.
26. And so not innate. Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet
with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained
the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not
being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they
cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be
supposed innate;- it being impossible that any truth which is innate (if there were any
such) should be unknown, at least to any one who knows anything else. Since, if they are
innate truths, they must be innate thoughts: there being nothing a truth in the mind that
it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there by any innate truths, they must
necessarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear.
27. Not innate, because they appear least where what is innate shows itself clearest.
That the general maxims we are discoursing of are not known to children, idiots, and a
great part of mankind, we have already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident they
have not an universal assent, nor are general impressions. But there is this further
argument in it against their being innate: that these characters, if they were native and
original impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those persons in whom yet we
find no footsteps of them; and it is, in my opinion, a strong presumption that they are
not innate, since they are least known to those in whom, if they were innate, they must
needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, savages, and
illiterate people, being of all others the least corrupted by custom, or borrowed
opinions; learning and education having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds;
nor by super-inducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters
nature had written there; one might reasonably imagine that in their minds these innate
notions should lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of
children do. It might very well be expected that these principles should be perfectly
known to naturals; which being stamped immediately on the soul, (as these men suppose,)
can have no dependence on the constitution or organs of the body, the only confessed
difference between them and others. One would think, according to these men's principles,
that all these native beams of light (were there any such) should, in those who have no
reserves, no arts of concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more
doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure and abhorrence of pain.
But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general
maxims are to be found? What universal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and
narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with, and which have
made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impressions. A child knows his nurse
and his cradle, and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced age; and a young
savage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of
his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will
expect these abstract maxims and reputed principles of science, will, I fear, find
himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts of
Indians: much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions
of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools and
academies of learned nations, accustomed to that sort of conversation or learning, where
disputes are frequent; these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation and useful
for conviction, but not much conducing to the discovery of truth or advancement of
knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of knowledge I shall have occasion
to speak more at large, 1. 4, c. 7.
28. Recapitulation. I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration.
And probably it will hardly go down with anybody at first hearing. I must therefore beg a
little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of censure, till I have been heard out
in the sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to better judgments. And
since I impartially search after truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced, that I have
been too fond of my own notions; which I confess we are all apt to be, when application
and study have warmed our heads with them.
Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to think these two speculative Maxims
innate: since they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find
is no other than what several propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in
with them: and since the assent that is given them is produced another way, and comes not
from natural inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse.
And if these first principles of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no
other speculative maxims can (I suppose), with better right pretend to be so.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Go: To the Table of Contents | This is the first Chapter | Forward to Next Chapter
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institute for Learning Technologies | Columbia University
Digital Classics Series