FREE ESSAY ON THE ROLE OF BOBBY KENNEDY THROUGHOUT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

THE ROLE OF BOBBY KENNEDY THROUGHOUT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Introduction
On the morning of Tuesday October 16, 1962, President John F. Kennedy was reading the
Tuesday morning newspapers in his bed at the Whitehouse. Not twenty fours hours before,
McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser, received the results of Major
Richard S. Heyser's U-2 mission over San Cristobal Cuba. In light of recent mysterious
Soviet and Cuban activities developing in the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean, the
president's administration had given the order to conduct reconnaissance missions over
the island of Cuba. In particular a fifty-mile trapezoidal swath of territory in western
Cuba was to be looked upon under intense scrutiny. A CIA agent reported in the second
week of September that this stretch of land was being guarded closely by Peruvian,
Colombian, and actual Soviet soldiers. There was a real reason to be suspicious of the
activity in western Cuba. The first of this U-2 reconnaissance mission would reveal a
shocking discovery.(Chang & William p.33-47)
The U-2 reconnaissance reports that Bundy received in full detail two 70-foot-long MRBMs
at San Cristobal. The news that Bundy would eventually have to expose to President
Kennedy would sound alarms not just in his administration or in the United States of
America, but throughout the entire world. Bundy did not tell the president that night. He
opted to allow him a good night's rest, the last he would have for some time, as it
turned out. Bundy felt there was nothing the president could do about the missiles that
night anyway, and he would need to be sharp the next morning.(Brugioni p.68) Besides
Bundy and the leadership of the U.S. intelligence community, Dean Rusk and his team at
State, as well as McNamara and the deputy secretary of defense, Roswell Gilpatric,
received word of the U-2's discovery before going to bed on October 15. Kennedy's
discovery of the missiles could wait till the next morning.(May & Zelikow p.24)
Thus on the morning of October 16, while Kennedy was lying in bed, Bundy informed that
the U-2 mission that flew over Cuba had spotted two nuclear missiles and six missile
transports southwest of Havana. Before the summer of that same year had ended, Khrushchev
had made the twin promise that "nothing will be undertaken before the American
Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate
the tension in the relations between our two countries," and ensured the president
through his own brother Robert F. Kennedy, the attorney general of the United States and
the president's closet advisor by means of a back channel, that only defensive weapons
were to be placed in Cuba.(Brugioni p56) This last and final statement left the young
attorney general and the entire administration to believe that no offensive nuclear
missiles, and certainly no weapons that were capable of hitting any target in the
continental United States were being placed in Cuba at this time.(Chang & William p67) 
The news brought to the Kennedy administration in the form of the U-2's telltale
photographs made nonsense of both of Khrushchev's pledges. But most importantly the
Soviet Union had equipped Cuba with an arsenal of Soviet nuclear missiles despite a
presidential statement only a month early that the United States would not tolerate such
a situation in the Western Hemisphere. Kennedy felt personally insulted by the deployment
of these missiles.(Fursenko & Naftali p.193) He thought that he had done everything
possible to defuse and smooth over tense relations with the Soviet Union even before he
took office in 1960. This devastating news from Cuba would result in the tense period in
Cold War history to date and perhaps its tensest period in the entire history of the
war.
Kennedy decided limit the information regarding the devastating news from Cuba to as
small a group as possible. This group would come to be known as the Executive Committee
of the National Security Council, or as it would later be known and shortened to simply
Ex Comm.(Brugioni p.45) This would be the group of Washington's sharpest and most
influential minds that would more or less decide the fate of the nation and the world. A
heavy responsibility would be carried on their shoulders. If they failed they we would
take the entire nation with them.
The group would come to include Charles Bohlen, the old Kremlin hand who was recently
named U.S. ambassador to France. Beside Bohlen it would include Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, as well as Undersecretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary of State for
Latin America Edwin M. Martin, as well as Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his deputies Roswell Gilpatric and Paul Nitze
represented the Defense Department. John McCone, head of the CIA, away on an urgent
family matter, was replaced by his deputy Marshall "Pat" Carter, and the CIA was also
represented by the head of the NPIC, Arthur Lundahl, whose analysts had found the missile
sites on the U-2 photographs. General Maxwell Taylor came as chairman of the JCS.
Rounding out the group were McGeorge Bundy and the Kennedy speechwriter Theodore
Sorensen, as well as Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon. Last but not least this group
of Washington's sharpest minds was joined and highly influenced by the President's
brother and closest advisor, the Attorney General of the United States, Robert F.
Kennedy.(May & Zelikow p.8-12)
Robert F. Kennedy would prove to be one of the most, if not the most important person
responsible in deciding the fate of the two world superpowers and essentially the entire
world next to Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Premier of the Soviet Union, and his own brother,
John F. Kennedy, the President of the United States. Even before the crisis reached a
head when the American government finally discovered the nuclear missiles in western
Cuba, Bobby Kennedy played a key role in attempting to guarantee America's worst
nightmare would never come to being. 
Through his own personal back channel to the Kremlin, a Soviet intelligence officer and
member of the KGB, Georgi Bolshakov, Kennedy attempted to shape and relay messages and
negotiations between the two superpowers in question.(Brugioni p.157) When Kennedy was
deceived through these private and often personal channels, there was no question that
Robert F. Kennedy felt a degree of personal insult and damage to his own pride. 
Kennedy would play a key role throughout all of the Ex Comm meetings, and while his
brother was away, there was no question that was in charge of these meetings. Throughout
these meetings, Bobby's own views on how to deal with this dramatic situation evolved
from a rather hawkish and indignant position; a wish to get even, to a much more moderate
and sensible, even dovish position on how to deal with the situation in question. Kennedy
would play an important role in shaping the final course of action in handling the drama
at hand.
Finally Kennedy would play the role of messenger and negotiator with the Soviet
ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, in negotiating the final deal and trade off
to defuse the conflict and end it once and for all. Involved in this secret negotiating,
the knowledge of which was possessed by less then ten men in both the United States and
the Soviet Union at this time is also laden with controversy, involving classified
documents and different accounts of the true story revealed on both the American and
Soviet side of the conflict, including the memoirs of Nikita S. Khrushchev himself.(Chang
& Kornbluh p.237)
Kennedy was one of the most important shapers of the entire conflict. Without his
presence it is unknown which direction this conflict would have taken. It would be Robert
F. Kennedy whom the president would rely on and trust the most in this situation. He was
one of the most vocal in dealing with the conflict and certainly one of the most
rational. He helped keep control of the situation and staved off the continued assaults
of the war hawks in congress who truly looked to attain the upper hand in the method of
dealing with this conflict. His great and important role in this conflict that will be
discussed, from his secret back channels to the Kremlin in the months before the crisis,
to the deals he would eventually present and make to the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.
Back Channels to the Kremlin
Robert F. Kennedy first met Georgi Bolshakov through Frank Holeman, an American
journalist for the New York Daily News. Bolshakov was a soviet intelligence agent. He had
been working for the Soviet intelligence agency GRU. The GRU, who began his grueling
training process in 1943, while the war with Hitler, was still very much in full swing.
Despite the war going on around him, Bolshakov was trained in a vigorous apprenticeship
for seven years to become a Soviet intelligence officer, and then attended a three-year
course at the High Intelligence School of the General Staff. In all his training lasted
until 1950 during which time he acquired some impressive English language skills. As a
result of his impressive English skills, Bolshakov was assigned to the TASS Soviet news
agency in Washington where he would be an editor whose main role in the office would be
to cultivate sources.(Brugioni p.157) 
After dedicating four years to this assignment aboard in Washington, Bolshakov was
recalled back to Moscow where he was to work under Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Georgi
Zhukov. When Zhukov was dismissed in 1957, a temporary halt was brought to Bolshakov's
career. However his career would see a rival by the end of the 1950's through his
friendship with the new son-in-law of Soviet Premier Khrushchev, Aleksei Adzhubei, the
husband of Rada Khrushchev. By 1960 Bolshakov was back in Washington working once again
for GRU.(Brugioni p. 157-9) 
Frank Holeman had first met Bolshakov in 1951 at a Soviet held lunch-in in Holeman's
honor. The two hit it off rather well and met infrequently and exchanged information.
Soviets soon began to value Holeman as a useful informant and encouraged this budding
relationship until Bolshakov was transferred back to Moscow in 1955.(Brugioni p.159) Upon
Bolshakov's return to Washington in 1960, Holeman was quick to reestablish ties with his
former acquaintance from Moscow. Soon after Holeman and Bolshakov began there
correspondence again, Holeman dropped the prospect to Bolshakov of possible meeting in
person to discuss national interests with the attorney general of the United States, the
brother of the President himself, Robert F. Kennedy. Bolshakov was taken off guard by the
suggestion, but was quite tempted and excited about possible taking face to face with
someone in such a position of American power as Kennedy. Despite his hidden enthusiasm,
Bolshakov replied to the journalist that he needed approval from his "embassy before such
a meeting could be proposed.(Brugioni p.160-4) What Bolshakov really needed was
permission for his boss in the GRU, whose identity is still unknown, who initially upon
hearing the proposal was rather surprised that one of his assistance would of interest to
the Attorney General of the United States and rejected the proposition. Why would some
one of such importance wish to speak to one of his assistants?
Despite the rejection by his superior and despite relaying the message back to Holeman
that he would be unable to meet with the attorney general, Bolshakov decided to risk it
anyway and meet up with Holeman on May 9th of 1961, just ten days after Holeman made his
initial proposal. Bolshakov chose the date of May 9th for the meeting with Bobby Kennedy
because it was a Soviet holiday in celebration of the defeat of fascism in 1945, and his
office with the GRU would be understaffed as most of his colleagues would be home
enjoying the holiday. Thus Bolshakov would be able to move around much easier.(Brugioni
p.166)
Holeman met Bolshakov at roughly 4:30 at a nearby restaurant in Georgetown. Bolshakov had
barely sat down to eat when Holeman asked him if he would be ready to meet Kennedy at
8:30 in front of the Justice Department office in Washington. Bolshakov was once again
caught off guard by the abruptness of the scheduling of the meeting, but agreed non-the
less to meet with Kennedy at this time. At 8:30 sharp Kennedy was waiting with one of his
aides on the steps of the Justice Department building. Holeman introduced the Soviet
intelligence officer to the Attorney General of the United States. With that Both Holeman
and the Kennedy aide left the two gentlemen to themselves to talk.(Brugioni p.167-8) The
groundwork was unofficially laid. From then on Robert F. Kennedy had his own personal
connection to the Kremlin, via a Soviet intelligence officer.
Khrushchev did not entirely condone Georgi Bolshakov's meetings with Bobby Kennedy. He
even wrote to President Kennedy himself that his ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in
Washington enjoyed his "complete trust," to encourage the use of regular diplomatic
communications.(Blight & Welch p.189) But the personal rapport between the president's
brother and the Soviet military intelligence officer was too great for the Kremlin or the
White House to wish to close down the Kennedy-Bolshakov back channel. 
Khruschev also had no problem using this back channel as the means for an initiative. The
channel had already been used in negotiations involving a nuclear test ban treaty and the
continuing stalemate in Berlin. Khruschev also saw a way in which he could take advantage
of the channel in an attempt to keep the Cuban Missile operation, codenamed Anadyr a
covert operation.(Brugioni p.175) Khrushchev new he couldn't possible prevent American
U-2 pilots from flying over the island of Cuba, but perhaps he could prevent them from
flying over Soviet ships delivering missiles and supplies necessary to make missile sites
operational whose destination was Castro's Caribbean communist paradise. 
Khrushchev instructions for Bolshakov were to convey to Bobby Kennedy that the Soviets
and Premier Khrushchev felt that reconnaissance missions via U-2 spy planes over the open
ocean were acts of harassment on the part of the United States and the ceasing of these
activities might lead to more friendly US-Soviet relations and a brighter opportunity for
peaceful coexistence. Bolshakov relayed his instructions and the Kennedy's agreed only
under the condition that the Berlin issue be iced. Khrushchev was reluctant to agree on
such a volatile issue as Berlin, but did promise not to do anything until after the
American elections in November and the Americans did cease to send spy planes over the
Atlantic.(Blight & Welch p.188-9)
However Bolshakov was left in the dark about the entire missile situation. On repeated
occasions Kennedy questioned Bolshakov on the weapons and materials being sent to Cuba by
the Soviet Union and Bolshakov repeatedly assured RFK that these weapons and materials
were purely of a defensive nature. The weapons were merely a means for Cuba to defend
itself against any possible aggregations.(Brugioni p. 175-6)
As recently as two weeks before the Kennedy administration became aware of the actual
missile situation in Cuba, Bolshakov came to Bobby with an important message. Kennedy's
at this point knew that the Cubans had already received state of the art SA-2 missiles
from the Soviets, which were designed as high-tech antiaircraft defensive missiles.(Cook
p.92) Robert Kennedy made time to see Bolshakov on October 5 because Bolshakov said he
had received and important message from Khrushchev. Kennedy usually affected a casual,
unbuttoned look with his Russian friend, but Bolshakov noticed that this day the attorney
general's shirt was meticulously buttoned. There was no small talk about Bolshakov's
vacation, which months before the men had considered taking together. Kennedy listened
and took notes as Bolshakov conveyed a pledge from Khrushchev that the Soviet Union was
sending only defensive weapons to Cuba.(Blight and Welch p.193) To be sure he had not
missed any nuance, Kennedy asked him to repeat the key phrase in the message. "The
weapons that the USSR is sending to Cuba will only be of a defensive character," said
Bolshakov.(Brugioni p.178) 
"In a short while," Kennedy explained, "I will have to report this to the president."
Indeed, from what Bolshakov new of Soviet intentions, what he was instructed to tell
Robert F. Kennedy was the truth? Bolshakov really believed that the Soviets had know
intention of placing offensive nuclear missiles capable of targeting any region in the
continental United States, at least without first informing the United States and the
Kennedy administration. Bolshakov was left in the dark. Bolshakov lived to see the end of
the Cold War; but he never got over his bitterness towards the Soviet Premier at having
been used to deceive the Kennedy's. Bolshakov was not informed about operation
Anadyr.(Blight & Welch p.197)
The deception that the Soviets employed through Bolshakov insulted the pride of both
Kennedy's but in particular that of Bobby, who was Bolshakov's friend. Perhaps that's why
Bolshakov was not informed of the operation. When it was brought to the attention that
the American government was well aware of the Soviet missiles in Cuban territory,
Bolshakov was dumbfounded and even a little confused. Bolshakov was not aware of the
missiles in Cuba until John F. Kennedy's administration itself had informed him that the
missiles were there and even showed him photographs. When he did view the photographs he
denied any expertise in rocketry. "I have never seen anything like these photographs,"
complained Bolshakov, "and cannot understand what is on them." He even suggested that
they just might be baseball diamonds. The Americans however were not pleased with these
results.(Blight & Welch p.197)
Bolshakov however did not prove to be totally useless to the Kennedy administration in
resolving the missile crisis. On October 23, Frank Holeman revealed to Bolshakov, that
the United States was willing to make a swap, Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles on the
island of Cuba, in exchange for American ballistic nuclear missiles in the NATO State of
Turkey on the borders of the Soviet Union. Kennedy was looking to remove the missiles in
Turkey anyway for they had become obsolete upon the development of a larger quantity of
higher quality missiles.(Cheney p.94) However GRU office in Washington chose to sit on
the information and not reveal it to Khrushchev and the Soviet presidium just yet.
Through Kennedy's Bolshakov connection, it was first revealed that the Kennedy
administration was willing to make a swap of missile installation in respective Soviet
and American allied states.(Brugioni p.224)
Bolshakov proved valuable in the months before the missile crisis to both the White House
and the Kremlin. Both used him as a source of intelligence regarding the other
superpower's plans. Bolshakov was Bobby Kennedy's initative in dealing with the Soviet
Union. 
Ultimately, however, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union used the Kennedy-Bolshakov channel
in a deceitful manner, deceiving the intelligence agent himself. Bolshakov was used to
cover Soviet-Cuban covert operations in the Atlantic Ocean and to reassure the Kennedy
administration that the Soviets had no plans to install offensive nuclear weapons capable
of wiping out the entire continental United States on the island of Cuba. 
To the contrary, the Soviets had planned for months to turn the small island nation of
Cuba and its six million people into a Soviet Island fortress only 90 miles off the coast
of Florida. This fortress would be fully equipped with not just medium range, but
intercontinental nuclear missiles, as well as a submarine base capable of supporting
nuclear submarines. In addition an entire Soviet garrison of 50,000 troops would be
stationed on the island equipped with the weapons and the defense systems required to
keep this fortress operational and eventually impregnable.(Cheney p.102) Bolshakov was
left completely in the dark about this situation, and intern so was the Kennedy
administration.
The situation infuriated both Kennedy's and as the missile crisis progressed, the
brothers relied less on the channel as a means to reach Moscow. It appeared obvious that
Bolshakov had no idea what kinds of weapons were being installed in Cuba. The Soviet
deception through Bolshakov helped to set the tone for Bobby Kennedy at the first Ex Comm
meetings in deciding exactly what to do about this devastating situation in Cuba.
Bolshakov was Bobby Kennedy's personal channel to Moscow and his friend. Moscow's use of
Bolshakov as a means of deceit and deception truly infuriated the younger Kennedy.
Kennedy was looking to get even. It was no surprise that when Kennedy entered the very
first Ex Comm meeting on October 16, 1962 Kennedy sat in his chair ready to act as a
hawk. (Fursenko & Naftali p.234) He was prepared to do what ever was necessary to remove
those missiles from Cuba. If it meant an air strike followed by an invasion, so be it.
Bobby Kennedy and the Ex Comm Meetings
The beginning of the Ex Comm talks for Robert F. Kennedy were marked by humiliation. The
humiliation that he was directly lied to by the Soviet Union through one of his closest
contacts and the humiliation that Castro had once again made the United States look like
a bunch of fools. He struggled in the early part of these Ex Comm meetings with that
humiliation on his shoulders.
Robert Kennedy believed that the missiles in Cuba represented an extremely valuable
bargaining chip for both the Soviets and the Cubans. His opinion was also shared by his
brother the president of the United States. 
Kennedy wondered whether Castro might not make new threats against Cuba's neighbors,
saying, "You move troops down into that part of Venezuela, we're going to fire these
missiles."(Fursenko & Naftali p.235) The attorney general in the first meeting of Ex Comm
was by far the strongest advocate for invasion. He understood his brother's sensitivity
toward the political impact of a U.S. reaction that was not considered commensurate to
the crime. But Robert Kennedy also expected Khrushchev simply to reload his missiles if
he lost his first group of missiles to an American air strike. The odds of destroying
every missile cleanly and efficiently with just one simple air strike were next to
impossible.(Fursenko & Naftali p.247)
Perhaps as a way of showing how an invasion could be made internationally acceptable,
Robert Kennedy brought up the quick fix that he had been advocating off and on since the
Bay of Pigs disaster. "We should also think of . . . whether there is some other way we
can get involved in this through . . . Guantanamo Bay, or something, . . . or whether
there's some ship that, you know, sink the Maine again or something."(Hinckle & William
p. 278) Kennedy was indeed grasping for straws suggesting such farfetched and outlandish
excuses for invading Cuba, under pretexts of questionable morality. However Kennedy was
confused and extremely frustrated by the current situation. Much of what Kennedy suggests
early on in the Ex Comm meetings were the venting of great frustration over the crisis.
None the less his brother, the president of the United States took Bobby Kennedy's
lamentations very seriously. Bobby was still his closest advisor and John F. Kennedy felt
the same frustration and confusion that his brother felt.
Initially most of the other members of Ex Comm barring the members of the actually
military who were present, supported a much more peaceful way of dealing with the
situation. Diplomacy was seen as an alternative means of dealing with such an explosive
situation. Llewellyn Thompson advocated a naval blockade of Cuba.(Dolan & Scariano p.105)
Believing it "very highly doubtful the Russians would resist a blockade against military
weapons . . ."(Dolan & Scariano p.105) Thompson argued that the best way to avoid peace
or at least legitimatize an invasion of Cuba was a combined stern coercion of blockade
with a public demand that Moscow dismantle its missile sites in Cuba. Thompson realized
that odds were this would not be enough to remove the missiles already existing in Cuba
and would not prevent them from becoming operational in the near future. He suggested
threatening to use force if Khrushchev ignored the U.S. demand. "I think we should be
under no illusions that this would probably in the end lead to the same thing," he said
with some resignation. "But we would do it under an entirely different posture and
background, and much less danger of getting into the big war."(Fursenko & Naftali p.253)
In the beginning Robert Kennedy, still very much a hawk disagreed in entirely with
Thompson. He saw the blockade as a "very slow death."(Thompson p.123) Robert Kennedy
envisioned that a blockade would last for months. He saw a great deal of conflict
involved in a naval blockade anyway. The stopping of Russian ships by the American navy
would cause chaos and possibly even retaliation by Russian ships. Russian ships would
dare the American navy to stop them, and no doubt about it there would be ships that
would attempt to run and break through any kind of naval blockade put into affect by the
United States Navy. Russian planes that attempted to fly over the American blockade would
have to me shot down which would lead to nothing more than an escalated mess.(Fursenko &
Naftali p. 256-9) These at least were Kennedy's arguments.
On October 19, the Ex Comm divided into two groups. There was the air strike team, which
included Treasury Secretary Dillon, Bundy, CIA director John McCone, and the former
secretary of state Dean Acheson who had now joined in on the Ex Comm meetings. Robert
Kennedy chose to join this group. Favoring the blockade were Secretary of Defense John
McNamara, Dean Rusk, Thompson, George Ball.(Blight & Welch p.235) The responsibility of
the two groups was to generate by the end of the day position papers that made the
strongest case possible for their preference. Over the next thirty-six hours, Robert
Kennedy played a key role in bringing these two groups together. He considered himself
apart of the air strike team, but his position on so drastic a measure was wavering.
While he still saw the naval blockade as full of headaches and weaknesses, he saw the air
strike position as even more dangerous.(Fursenko & Naftali p.263-4)
The reason he was wavering was not that agreed with Thompson or the others, rather he
began to fully recognize the consequence of the alternative air strike. An air strike
left little room for the Soviet Union and communist Cuba to manuver. In a situation such
as the one placed upon them in an air strike, the two communist nations would seemingly
have no choice but to fight back and defend themselves.(Blight & Welch p.229) 
In the morning Bobby Kennedy argued that the U.S. airforce should simply go and make the
attack without warning. Only after a full air strike was made against the Soviet Cuban
positions on the island should the United States go to the Organization of American
States. This was Kennedy's view. By the evening of the same day, he was firmly against
striking without warning. Kennedy realized the cowardlyness in such an attack. A similar
surprise attack was made on the day of December 7th, 1945, a day that would live in
infamy. There was no way Kennedy decided, that he would allow his brother to be compared
with Tojo of Japan, in reference to the Japanese sneak on the American navy stationed in
Pearl Harbor that eventually lead to American involvement in World War II. The United
States was not in the tradition of cowardlyness.(Blight & Welch p.230) While he still was
leaning towards an air strike or at least an eventual air strike over a naval blockade,
he realized that the Soviet response to such a strike would be far more prepared if they
were warned previously. None the less Bobby Kennedy had become dead set against a
preemptive without warning strike on the island of Cuba. As a result, he had changed his
mind about resorting to a blockade as a first step.(Thompson p.145)
By the time John F. Kennedy had arrived back at the White House after a scheduled cross
country trip across the United States early Saturday morning, Bobby Kennedy was firmly
locked into the blockade camp of Ex Comm. If a vote were to take place in Ex Comm, the
air strike camp would lose. Robert F. Kennedy upon weighing the options of an air strike
over taking the first step as an announced military blockade realized that the
consequences of the air strike made the blockade far more appealing.(Fursenko & Naftali
p.267) At least the blockade could buy time and allow the Soviets to retreat without a
single shot being fired. It was President Kennedy who in fact needed convincing of the
impracticality of an air strike as opposed to a naval blockade.
Kennedy would indeed take some convincing that the blockade would be a safer alternative
to an outright surgical air strike on Soviet missile positions in Cuba. However in light
of new CIA intelligence that intelligence agency understood that the operational status
of the missiles and the possibility of hitherto undiscovered missile sites were the
issues closest to the president's heart and potentially most relevant to his final
decision.(Hinckle & William p.287) 
Thus with the help Bobby Kennedy bringing the Ex Comm group together and the shining of
light onto newly found intelligence, the blockade camp carried the day. On Monday morning
Kennedy would give a nationally televised address, followed by the imposition of a
limited blockade a day later. Kennedy realized that the pentagon barring McNamara was
against the decision, but was affirmed by General Taylor that the U.S. armed services
would back the president's decision completely.(Hinckle & William p. 293) 
Robert Kennedy also argued that the pretext behind a naval blockade of the island of Cuba
should be of a moral pretext. He argued that the pretext of a naval blockade should
involve the deception of the Soviets in there placing of nuclear weapons on the island of
Cuba despite American warnings of what would be the consequences of such an action.
President Kennedy however rejected this moral pretext. Kennedy stated flatly why there
was not an acceptable military option at this stage in the crisis. The Soviet Union's
mobile MRBM (medium range ballistic missile) bases "can be set up quite quickly," and for
this reason and this reason alone he was sure there were more on the island had
previously been detected.(Cohen p.175) 
Kennedy no longer believed the Soviets would act prudently in the event of war. After all
it was not very prudent of the Soviet Union to seriously believe it could place nuclear
missiles right under the nose of America and easily get away with it. Kennedy thought
that maybe even the Soviets were itching for the fight. Right up till Kennedy's address,
the Soviets were unaware that the Americans had idea that the United States knew of the
ballistic missiles in Cuba. Howe