FREE ESSAY ON THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

One of the greatest conflicts in the history of the world, that of World War II, changed
the course of events in Western societies for the rest of the 20th Century. Its effects
are felt today even today with the final ascent of the United States as a superpower and
the decline of Europe. In fact, World War II was the final judgment concerning European
domination of the world. However, many have said that World War II was a continuation of
World War I, a war which destroyed much of Europe, crippled its domination of the world
with its ruinous economic ramifications, and created the "lost generation" of millions of
wounded and dead soldiers. These changes contributed to the downfall of European society.
John Maynard Keynes observes, "Perhaps it is historically true that no order of society
ever perishes save by its own hand." (1) In fact, the victorious Allies of World War I
condemned themselves to another world war with the Treaty of Versailles, particularly
with respect to its effects on the vanquished country of Germany. The conditions of the
Treaty of Versailles and their inherent weaknesses set the stage in Germany for yet
another world war.
French insistence upon crippling Germany influenced many of the conditions set forth in
the treaty. The chief aims of the French towards the disabling of the German state were
concerned the disarmament of Germany, the demilitarization and occupation of Allied
military forces in the German Rhineland and Saar Basin for fifteen years, the severe
reparations, the cession of German territory. (2) The Germans ultimately resented the
harsh conditions of the treaty, promoting even more animosity between the two nations
when plenty had already existed earlier. Germany was forced to give up all overseas
possessions, which the Allies administered as mandates. (3) In addition, France
resurrected Poland to dismantle Germany's eastern borders. (4) This separated East
Prussian from the rest of Germany by the Polish Corridor (5), which contained a large
German population. (6) These conditions would later resurface as major issues in Hitler's
Germany twenty years later. Furthermore, Article 102 of the treaty established "...the
town of Danzig...as a Free City." (7) The controversy surrounding this provision
developed as a sensitive issue to the Germans since the population of Danzig was largely
German. To the Germans, these conditions added insult to injury. Unfortunately, the
treaty did not stop with these conditions.
The Treaty of Versailles has become infamous for the harsh reparations it imposed on
Germany. Perhaps even more notorious is the "War Guilt Clause" contained in the peace.
The "War Guilt Clause," Article 231 in the treaty, arose out of a controversy during the
negotiations in the spring of 1919 concerning the nature of reparations that would be
collected. It was argued whether or not to include war costs in the reparations to be
levied or "just" civilian damages suffered. Prime Minister David Lloyd-George of Britain
and Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, unsure of whether or not war costs would be
include, "...insisted that the treaty assert at least the moral right of the Allies to
recover the cost of the war forced upon them by Germany." (8) Lloyd-George maintained
that "...if we do not exact it [war costs], it is not because it would be unjust to claim
it..." (9) This sentiment, though meeting opposition from President Wilson's delegation,
resulted in the inclusion of Article 231 in the treaty. The provision, after Germany's
Weimar Republic delegates signed the treaty on June 28, 1919, bound the German nation to
accept full moral responsibility for all damages to the citizens of the Allied countries
and for the precipitation of the war itself. (10) The provision blatantly ignored
Austria-Hungary's culpability in the conflict, as that country was completely dismantled
by a separate treaty. 
The effects of Article 231 were far-reaching. Besides the obvious discontent such a
provision would cause in any nation, German governments used it to rally their people
against the Allies in combination with the controversial French occupation in the western
regions of Germany, most notably Hitler in the 1930's. (11) In addition, although David
Lloyd-George supported the clause, Great Britain throughout the 1920's and 1930's showed
their ironic guilt over the provision by their continuing policy of appeasement. (12)
Hitler proved to be the greatest benefactor of that guilt in the 1930's as he invaded
Austria and then Czechoslovakia.
The Reparation Settlement imposed on Germany by the Allied Powers grew to be hated by the
German people. The basis for the reparations (which became a euphemism for indemnities)
was that Germany was obligated to compensate for the civilian and property damage
inflicted upon the Allies, as stated in Article 232 of the treaty. (13) The Reparation
Settlement was the worst condition set upon Germany-the country could not possibly hope
to meet its demands and maintain financial security at the same time. Chambers et al
state, "Germany was made liable for sums unspecified and without foreseeable end..." (14)
John Maynard Keynes describes the most crippling of the reparations. Germany had to
relinquish to France complete possession and rights to the Saar Basin coalmines for
fifteen years. After that period, if the people of the region voted to reunite with
Germany, Germany had to "...repurchase the mines at a price payable in gold." (15) This
condition was a slap in the face: the Saar Basin had been a German region for the better
part of 1,000 years. (16) The economic effects of this confiscation of Germany's vital
resource were devastating.
The second most crippling reparation concerned Germany's merchant marine ships. The
Allies forces the German state to give up all ships above 1600 tons, half between 1000
and 1600 tons, and one quarter of its fishing boats and trawlers, including the ones
under construction. (17) The dismantling of both Germany's coal industry and its trade
capabilities would create the desired effect of the German economy for which the Allies
hoped. As far as the matter of monetary compensation, the treaty set up the Reparations
Commission to take care of its collection.
The Allies refused to rely on German good faith for the payment of reparations, so they
included in the Treaty of Versailles the Reparations Commission. Its base function was
the extraction from Germany "...year after year the maximum sum obtainable." (18)
However, Keynes points out the problem in advance of this system: "...the sum when fixed
will prove in excess of what can be paid in cash and in excess of what can be paid at
all." (19) The problem indicated here is that no limit on the amount of reparations to be
paid by Germany each year had been set, nor had a time limit for the payments to end been
established. The Germans kept finding themselves in one hopeless situation after another
with seemingly endless debt. In the end, though, the treaty itself hampered the
Reparations Commission by not setting any definable limits of payment, and the entire
reparations system eventually fell apart. One of the weaknesses of the treaty was the
indecisiveness on the part of the diplomats that created it.
The treaty soon proved to be ineffective in practice, partially a result of the
misgivings of Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd-George, respectively Prime Minister of
France and Prime Minister of Great Britain. Clemenceau clearly distrusted his British
allies, saying, "...there was no serious opposition to the harshest clauses of the
Armistice except among our British allies, who were applying themselves heartily to the
task of sparing Germany..." (20) Paul Birdsall shows the actual British sentiment at the
time of the treaty, although his evaluation is not as harsh as Clemenceau's: "...the
British delegates particularly were beginning to show symptoms of that guilt complex that
has so profoundly affected post-Versailles British policy." (21) Birdsall refers to the
well-known British policy of appeasement concerning the demands of Hitler's Germany
preceding World War II, directly a result of the harsh terms of the treaty. Clemenceau
apparently held some reservations about the treaty himself. In his thoughts on the French
occupation of the Rhineland, as a revenge for the forty-eight year German occupation of
Alsace-Lorraine, he says, "From distant times warriors of all countries have had nothing
but a system of annexation for their policy of aggressive defence, and this conception of
an organization of military disequilibrium has merely maintained the warlike habits it
had been intended to abolish." (22) Here, about ten years after the signing of the Treaty
of Versailles, Clemenceau's warning sounds hypocritical in light of his ardent
participation in putting forth the conditions of the Treaty. The disunity of the Allied
leaders contributed to the weakness and ineffectiveness of the treaty.
Although originally the Germans had been in support of the Treaty of Versailles, which
they believed would be based on President Wilson's Fourteen Points, their hopes of
lenient peace settlement were crushed. Wilson's Fourteen Points were designed to create a
lasting peace in Europe and embodied many liberal ideals. The Fourteen Points included
open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, open trade, disarmament, fair adjustment of colonial
claims, a just and lasting peace, self-determination, "...no annexations, no
contributions, and no punitive damages," and most importantly a League of Nations. (23)
The German people in the closing months of the war began to push for peace, believing
that such a peace would be based on the Fourteen Points. German liberals were romanced by
the liberal reforms suggested, merchants and manufacturers thought that they would reduce
post war reprisals against them, imperialists gained the hope of retaining some or all of
Germany's colonies, and the freedom of the seas provision attracted all Germans, who
despised the despotic control of the British navy of the world's seas. (24) However, the
Germans only defender at the peace negotiations because they were not included was
President Wilson and his delegation, which constantly gave in on most of the provisions
of the Fourteen Points in order to ensure the inclusion of the League of Nations in the
peace settlement. The German delegates signed a vastly different treaty than they
expected in June of 1919.
The inclusion of the League of Nations in the Versailles Treaty was promising, but
ultimately the League proved to be weak. President Wilson presented the treaty to a
hostile Senate and an increasingly disinterested American public. The Senate passed the
treaty, but made several alterations that were unacceptable to Wilson, and he refused to
sign it into law. Therefore, the U.S., whose power and force of moderation was vital to
the League of Nations, did not enter the League it had itself in part designed. This had
several effects. First and foremost, it "...impaired the authority and prestige of the
League at its birth..." (25) In addition, it ensured a lack of American cooperation with
Britain that might have served to stabilize Europe and subdue a vindictive France. (26)
As a result, the British and French were reduce to dueling leaders in the League, leaving
Europe and particularly Germany to the social and economic upheaval that produced
Hitler's totalitarian rule in the 1930's. (27) The weaknesses of the treaty and weakness
of the League ensured future conflict because of the lack of stability they caused in a
socially and economically torn Europe.
Before long, Germany took advantage of the treaty's weaknesses. Although the treaty and
the League of Nations established by the document called for general disarmament, the
French argued that "Security Precedes Disarmament." (28) Unfortunately, the Allies'
failure to disarm gave the Germans a moral case to rearm themselves. (29) This ideology
worked particularly well in Hitler's hands, as he reconstructed the German war machine in
the 1930's. Clemenceau cites concrete facts indicating the lack of Allied control and
enforcement of the treaty in Germany even before Hitler rose to power. He cites in a
table the requirements for disarmament in the treaty, then shows what Germany actually
produced:
Rifles: 84000 Heavy machine guns: 792
Carbines: 18000 Light machine guns: 1134
Total: 102000 Total: 1926
Medium trench mortars: 83 Field artillery:
Light trench mortar: 189 7.7 cm guns: 204
Total: 252 10.5 cm Howitzers: 84
Total: 288
Clemenceau claims that in between 1925-1930 Germany produced:
300000 rifles
20000 machine guns
19000 trench mortars
2000 artillery guns
(30)
The above figures indicate a complete lack of Allied supervision over German production.
This lack of supervision combined with the depression and the harsh reparations of the
treaty opened the door for a revolution ending in dictatorship under Adolf Hitler in
Germany.
Public reaction in Germany to the treaty was to say the least unfavorable. In addition to
the devastation of World War I, the reparations imposed on Germany precipitated a deep
depression before 1924. Only after the Weimar Republic busted into national bankruptcy
and the mark ceased to exist as a practical means of payment did the Allied countries
base reparations on Germany's ability to pay them. (31) Because of the reparations, many
Germans, in particular the industrialists who lost wealth and power with the Saar and
Rhineland occupation by the French, proved to be hostile to the republic, maintaining
that it had betrayed the German people by accepting the treaty. (32) As a result of this
increasing opposition that won over the sentiments of most Germans, uprisings and
protests constantly impaired the government's institutions in the 1920's. (33) The most
significant of these uprisings was of course the Putsch in Munich led by Hitler in 1923.
The National Socialist Party of Germany gained in popularity slowly during the 1920's,
finally becoming a viable political entity in after the Great Depression reached Germany
after 1929. After the economic collapse spiraled Germany into poverty in the early
1930's, many Germans accepted Hitler's belief that the Allies would not end their seeming
persecution of Germany by the appeal of reason, but by force. (34) Although the economic
collapse was inevitable in light of the increasingly interconnected world market, it was
exaggerated by the hatred of the harsh reparations, the "War Guilt Clause," and the
humiliation the Germans suffered from French occupation in the west.
Adolf Hitler manipulated the German intolerance with the Versailles Treaty to push
Germany into several confrontations that eventually resulted in World War II. Hitler
maintained that the second world war was caused by the Treaty's "iniquities," (35)
concerning the harsh conditions of the document. Chambers et al state that "...in German
eyes, the Treaty was an intolerable Dictate...," and that the German parliament had been
forced to accept it. (36) Hitler capitalized heavily on this German sentiment. In his
speech to Reichstag on September 1, 1939, on the eve of World War II and almost exactly
twenty years after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler declared the treaty
void:
For us Germans the dictated Treaty of Versailles is not law. It will not do to blackmail
a person at the point of a pistol with the threat of starvation for millions of people
into signing a document and afterwards proclaim that this document with its forced
signature was a solemn law. (37)
With the above justification, Hitler maneuvered Germany into World War II. The Treaty of
Versailles provided him with the excuse of revenge as a motive for Germany's aggressions
in the years before the second world war. Resentment among the German people towards the
suffering and humiliation they had been enduring at the hands of the hated treaty fueled
Hitler's cause. 
The Treaty of Versailles accomplished nothing more than to cause yet another world war.
This time the destruction would be complete. Germany would lose its sovereignty for
almost half a century, split between democracy and communism. European decline was
completed, and two new powers dominated the world: the United States and the Soviet
Union. The Old World countries of Europe would never again wield the power they once had,
victims of their own vengeful "reactionary nationalism." (38) The Treaty of Versailles
brought what many had begun to expect it would: war.
Endnotes
1 Keynes, John Maynard, The Economic Consequences of Peace, (New York: Harcourt, Bruce,
and Howe, 1920), 238.
2 Birdsall, Paul, Versailles Treaty Twenty Years After, (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock,
1941), 295.
3 Keynes, Economic Consequences, 67.
4 Birdsall, Versailles Treaty, 173.
5 Ibid., 177.
6 Ibid., 180.
7 Brian Tierney and Joan Scott, eds., Western Societies: A Documentary History, Vol. 2,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), "German Surrender: The Versailles Treaty," 480.
8 Birdsall, Versailles Treaty, 253.
9 Ibid., 253.
10 Ibid., 254.
11 Ibid., 255.
12 Ibid., 255.
13 Tierney and Scott, Western Societies, 431.
14 Chambers, Mortimer, Raymond Grew, David Herlihy, Theodore Robb, Isser Woloch, The
Western Experience, Vol. 2, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Sixth Edition, 1995), 896.
15 Keynes, Economic Consequences, 82.
16 Ibid., 83.
17 Ibid., 66.
18 Ibid., 167.
19 Ibid., 209.
20 Clemenceau, Georges, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, Trans. F.M. Atkinson, (New York:
Harcourt, Bruce, and Company, 1930), 120.
21 Birdsall, Versailles Treaty, 169.
22 Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery, 257.
23 Bailey, Thomas A., Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1944), 23-24.
24 Ibid. 28.
25 Birdsall, Versailles Treaty, 297.
26 Ibid., 297.
27 Ibid., 297.
28 Ibid., 128.
29 Ibid., 170.
30 Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery, 337-338.
31 Wheeler-Bennett, John W., The Wreck of Reparations, (New York: Howard Fertig, Inc.,
1972), 22.
32 Birdsall, Versailles Treaty, 301.
33 Ibid., 301.
34 Ibid., 301.
35 Ibid., 1.
36 Chambers, The Western Experience, 896.
37 Tierney and Scott, Western Societies, "World War II: Hitler's Speech to the Reichstag
(September 1, 1939)," 498.
38 Birdsall, Versailles Treaty, 10.
Bibliography
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